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Abstract: China’s pension system is facing a large gap of more than one trillion RMB. The 
investment efficiency of the social security fund therefore receives widespread attention in 
academic circles. We collected data of stocks held by the Chinese National Council for Social 
Security Fund (CNCSSF) from 2004 to 2012 to research the stocks’ investment efficiency, 
distinguishing between direct investment by the CNCSSF and entrusted investment by fund 
companies. The results indicate that both components of the Chinese Social Security Fund 
investment have efficiency drawbacks. Direct investment by the CNCSSF does not obtain 
excess returns, while entrusted investment reaches an annual excess return of 4.32 percent 
because more private information is available to fund companies than to the CNCSSF during 
asset allocation. Further analyses of this paper find, however, that the Chinese Social Security 
Fund has a significant market-stabilizing effect, which is almost three times stronger than the 
market-stabilizing effect of entrusted investment. In general, entrusted investment performs 
better than direct investment with regard to investment efficiency, while direct investment 
performs better in terms of market stabilization.  
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I. Introduction 
From the 1980s onward, the majority of the literature on social security funds has 
focused on fund returns, finding that social security funds are not able to obtain 
excess market returns, which in turn reflects the efficient market hypothesis in the US 
and the UK. Current research, however, has used a larger sample and advanced 
methods to show that it is possible to obtain excess market returns. This paper focuses 
on market stabilization and investor return perspectives to scrutinize previous research.  
The majority of the research indicates that pension fund returns cannot exceed market 
returns, stated for example by Beebower and Bergstrom (1977), who studied the 
portfolios of 148 pension funds in the United States from 1966-1975. The authors 
used the CAPM model to calculate the sample’s Jensen alpha and they found that the 
pension funds’ returns are lower than the S&P 500 by 144 percentage points. Similarly, 
Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) analyzed 91 US pension funds and found that 
their return was lower than the S&P 500 by 1.1 percent. Ippolito and Turner (1987) 
point out that the small sample size of pension funds will affect statistical tests; a 
survival bias could have a direct impact on the calculation results. To solve this 
problem, Ippolito and Turner selected a larger sample of 1526 US pension funds 
whose returns were lower than the S&P 500 by only 0.44 percent. Since the 1980s 
both pension size and the number of pension funds in the United States have increased, 
while pension fund returns have not. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishney (1992), for 
instance, selected 769 pension funds in the United States from the 1980s. These funds’ 
returns were lower than the S&P 500 by 1.3 percent. The same holds true for the UK. 
Here, Thomas and Tonks (2001) selected 2175 pension funds from 1984 to 1997, 
showing that the pension funds do not achieve excess returns. Gregory and Tonks 
(2004) demonstrate that the English pension funds they studied have a home bias, but 
were still unable to achieve extra market returns. 
In order to identify the reasons for the low investment income of pension funds, many 
researchers analyze investment ability and asset allocation. For example, Coggin, 
2 
 
Fabozzi and Rahman (1993) analyzed a sample of 71 pension funds in the United 
States, from the angle of the fund managers’ stock-picking and timing ability. They 
found that pension funds have a positive stock-picking ability. However, their timing 
ability is low and therefore reduces investment return. Blake, Lehmann and 
Timmermann (1999) also show that the fund managers’ stock-picking and timing 
ability make a negative contribution towards 364 selected English pension funds from 
1986-1994. 
The idea that pension funds cannot obtain extra market returns confirms the "efficient 
market hypothesis", which suggests that timely information will affect price, and that 
investors cannot always achieve excess returns (Fama, 1970). To the contrary, many 
scholars in recent years have found that pension funds are able to obtain excess 
returns. Elton, Gruber and Blake (2006), e.g., find that the 401k plan in the United 
States, which is entrusted to mutual funds, has a higher annual average return than 
that of the stock index by 0.31 percent. Bauer et al. (2010) selected 463 pension funds 
in the United States from 1990 to 2006 and found that the observed pension funds 
taken together do not obtain excess returns; however, a few individual small-scale 
pension funds are able to achieve excess returns of 3 percent.  
Current studies identify three main reasons for pension funds’ ability to generate 
excess returns: centralized investment, active investment and private information 
arbitrage. Firstly, as professional institutional investors, funds (including pension 
funds) have a distinct advantage in investment techniques and information gathering 
methods and are therefore able to obtain higher returns using centralized investment 
(Levy and Livingston, 1995). Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) found that 
investment ability has an increasing returns-to-scale effect; thus fund managers will 
select a centralized investment strategy. Investment diversification, on the other hand, 
may decrease risk, but may not achieve the same returns. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) 
found that a professional analysis can enhance performance considerably. They 
constructed an industry concentration indicator and found that mutual fund returns are 
positively correlated with portfolio concentration. 
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 The second reason is active investment. Wermers (2000) states that funds that are 
highly active each year can achieve 1.3 percent in excess returns. Wermers (2003) 
used the tracking error of the active investment capacity of the fund portfolio and the 
S&P 500 index to measure the fund’s active investment and confirms that active 
investment funds have a greater stock-picking ability. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) 
used the deviation of fund portfolio and index fund to build active investment 
indicators. They show that active investment in the fund can lead to excess returns. 
The greater the deviation of the fund portfolio from the index, the higher the 
achievable returns can be. Brands et al. (2006), Cremers and Petajisto (2009) used the 
Euclidean distance method to calculate the active investment indicator of the fund and 
point out that an active investment fund’s performance increases with a higher 
indicator. 
The third reason for excess returns is private information arbitrage. In an imperfect 
market, asset information distribution is unbalanced. In other words, some financial 
actors have more useful information about an asset than others. Informed traders may 
use this private information to generate higher returns (Merton, 1987). Fund managers, 
through a variety of bonus incentives, will increase their efforts to study market trends, 
collect stocks’ private information, and will therefore benefit from private information. 
Teoh et al., (2009), Amihud and Geyonko (2013) used the R2 indicator of fund returns 
and market returns to measure the mutual funds’ access to private information. They 
hypothesize that the (1-R2) indicator includes mutual funds’ heterogeneity information, 
which cannot be observed. The higher (1-R2), the more private information a mutual 
fund possesses. Amihud and Geyonko (2013) found empirical evidence that funds 
with more private information are able to obtain excess returns of 2.5 percent per year. 
Luo (2011) and Shen et al. (2013) also confirm a positive correlation between private 
information and excess returns in China.  
Chinese scholars have not yet systematically analyzed the rate of return of social 
security funds. Existing research usually consists of small sample sizes, a short time 
span and methods which are not of a high scientific standard and hence make it 
4 
 
difficult to control for the fund’s investment risk. Therefore, Chinese research often 
results in the conclusion that there is a large sample shortcoming. Wang (2010), for 
instance, selected 29 CNSSF portfolios from 2005-2010 and byusing the CAPM 
model, suggests that the CNSSF has a sound stock-selection ability. Liu and Tang 
(2011) studied the 2009-2010 quarterly CNSSF data and point out that the CNSSF has 
obvious positive effects on companies’ share price in the short term and that listed 
companies with CNSSF holdings have significantly higher share price returns. 
Nevertheless, there are many important issues which remain unanswered in China. Is 
the CNSSF able to perform better than the market and can it achieve excess returns? 
Is there any performance difference between the CNCSSF direct stock investment and 
entrusted investment? Is CNSSF return related to the access to inside market 
information and to asset allocation? We aim to select a larger sample and longer time 
span than the existing studies by using the Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model, as well as a panel data analysis to examine these issues and to 
provide a deeper understanding of CNSSF investment efficiency. 
In addition, the market-stabilizing effect of the social security fund has been proven. 
Guercio and Tkac (2002) found that market-oriented operations of pension funds in 
the market act as “automatic stabilizers”. As a result there is a linear relationship 
between liquidity and pension fund performance. Pension funds have the ability to 
select fund managers, they can retract investments when fund performance is bad, and 
can, conversely, increase investment when fund performance is good. Pension funds 
entrust investors and put pressure on fund managers to secure lower risk and higher 
returns, which can decrease market system risk and stabilize the market. Bohl (2006) 
suggests that Polish pension funds affect the stock market index in a way that reduces 
the degree of fluctuations in the market. Although He (2007), Sheng (2008), Cai and 
Song (2010) point out that institutional investors in China have a market-stabilizing 
function, there is no evidence that the CNSSF can stabilize the stock market. Most 
importantly, no study so far has linked the low return of CNSSF to a market-
stabilizing function. A negative influence of the CNSSF’s market-stabilizing function 
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on returns would explain CNSSF inefficiency. Past research has entirely neglected the 
fact that the CNSSF places both direct and entrusted investments, and fails to 
distinguish between the two investment styles. This paper examines the efficiency of 
CNSSF investment, carries out a comparative analysis of direct investment and 
entrusted investment returns and these investment types’ ability to stabilize the market.  
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1 Data selection  
The CNCSSF was established in August 2000 to become the operational statutory 
body of the CNSSF. In order to improve the investment performance of the CNSSF, 
the CNCSSF reached an agreement with the People's Bank of China, the Ministry of 
Finance and the China Securities Regulatory Commission by the end of 2003,. It 
commissioned six fund management companies to be entrusted investors of the 
CNSSF. As of the end of 2012, the number of commissioned fund management 
companies stands at eighteen. The CNSSF can place investments either through these 
18 entrusted companies or through the CNCSSF itself. The investment channels 
include bonds, trusts, stocks, funds, equity investments, asset securitization and equity 
investment funds. However, the CNCSSF does not disclose portfolio investment 
details, making it difficult to obtain information about the asset allocation of the 
CNSSF.  
The Chinese disclosure obligation of listed companies, however, gives us access to 
the CNSSF’s equity investments. Since listed companies are required to disclose the 
number of their shareholders and the shareholders’ names, we have access to 
shareholder information and select the information according to “CNSSF *** 
combination”, “CNSSF *** portfolio” in order to collect the social security fund 
portfolio investment details. To ensure the validity of the entrusted investment details, 
we used the disclosed CNSSF portfolio information provided by the CNCSSF website 
in order to verify and complement the CNSSF investment details (see Table 1). We 
distinguish between direct investments and entrusted CNSFF investments. All the data 
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stems from the Wind database. 
From the Wind database we obtained CNCSSF holdings data, stock yield, the size of 
the stock assets, financial data, the return of net asset value, and scale data from 
securities companies. In order to ensure data quality, we randomly selected sample 
data and we also used the RESSET database (RESSET) to compare differences in the 
data. If there was a discrepancy between the Wind database and the RESSET 
database,1we downloaded the annual reports from the websites of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange to review the statements. CNSSF Annual 
Report data stems from the CNCSSF website. 
Table 1 shows CNSSF direct investment and entrusted investment from 2004 to 2012. 
The entrusted companies commissioned by the CNCSSF possessed at least 3 and up 
to 9 portfolios they invested in. Boshi Fund, Huaxia Fund and Harvest Fund managed 
7 CNSSF portfolios, the other fund companies managed 3-6 CNSSF portfolios. The 
state-owned company China International Capital Corporation (CICC) managed 3 
CNSSF portfolios. In general, the main types of CNSSF investments included bonds 
and the Shanghai and Shenzhen index funds so as to control the investment risk. 
However, such investment channels result in lower returns. In order to obtain higher 
gains, the CNCSSF allowed part of the fund’s portfolio to build up stock funds and 
stock-and-bond mixed active funds. We used these equity and hybrid active 
investment funds and attempted to analyze whether there is an efficiency difference 
between direct investment and entrusted investment. 
  
  1 Both RESSET and Wind database are famous databases in China; more than 90% of research 
papers use the two databases. RESSET data is collected by Tsinghua University Economic and 
Management school, while Wind is operated by a business data company, most investment 
institutions use Wind data for data collection.    
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Table 1       CNSSF Managed by Mutual Funds 
Fund company Portfolio number Portfolio code names provided by CNCSSF 
CNCSSF 5 001,   002,   004,   005,   006  
Boshi Fund 9 102,   103,   108,   202,   402,   501,  702, 802, 902  
Huaxia Fund 7 007,   107,   203,   801,   901  
Jiashi Fund 7 106，206，306，406，504，602, 706  
Penghua Fund 6 104，204，304，404，503，704  
Changsheng Fund 6 105,   205,   305,   405,   603,   705  
Yifangda Fund 5 109,   407,   502,   601,   707  
Nanfang Fund 5 101，201，301，401,   701 
Zhaoshang Fund 4 110,   408,   604,   708 
Guotai Fund 3 111,   409,   709  
Zhongjin Corp. 3 112,   410,   710 
 
 
3.2 Research Design 
Firstly, can the CNSSF’s stock investment achieve excess returns? From the data 
collected, we can observe that the CNSSF prefers to invest partially in share funds 
and hybrid funds and is thus exposed to more risk. According to classical investment 
theory (Fama and French, 1993), if the CNSSF achieves extra market gains after the 
risk-adjusted market returns, the investment can be regarded as efficient, otherwise it 
is inefficient. We use Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models in this 
paper for a risk adjustment of the CNSSF’s portfolio. The average excess return of the 
CNSSF amounts to 3.76 percent, however this amount is not significant. A more 
detailed analysis of the data reveals that entrusted investment amounts to 4.32 percent 
while direct investment was not able to achieve excess return. This scenario reveals 
that it is better to entrust investment than to invest directly. But can any entrusted 
institution outperform direct investment? In other words, which entrusted institution 
performs better? We used Carhart’s four-factor model to analyze investment 
efficiency in China. The results show that Nanfang Fund excess returns are the 
highest at 17.1 percent in one year, followed by Yifangda Fund at 9.56 percent, 
Zhaoshang Fund at 9.12 percent, and Huaxia Fund at 5.65 percent. As for Zhongjin 
Fund, its return was below expectations at -22.7 percent. The remaining funds’ returns, 
for example Changsheng Fund, Jiashi Fund and Penghua Fund, do not differ from 
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direct investment returns. These results show that 4 out of 10 entrusted investment 
funds are able to achieve excess market returns, which means that the CNSSF has to 
select certain entrusted investment funds to work with.  
Secondly, why do the investments of CNSSF have different rates of return? How does 
this difference come about? In a market with incomplete information, investors with 
inside information are able to produce excess market returns (Merton, 1987). The 
question is hence whether the CNCSSF, as a national organization, has access to 
inside market information. The general public is interested in the CNCSSF’s overall 
investment because they believe that the CNCSSF has access to such information. If 
this is true, can this information provide for extra market gains? We investigated these 
questions by using the Amihud and Geyonko (2013) private information index and 
control for depth, width and risk of asset allocation. The results show that the 
CNCSSF does indeed have private information which allows for extra returns. If the 
amount of private information grows by 1 unit, excess return increases by 0.477 
percent. This finding proves the theory of Merton (1987). However, access to inside 
market information results in an endogenous reverse causality problem. This paper 
uses mutual funds’ average access to inside market information as an instrumental 
variable of the CNSSF, and a panel of two-stage instrumental variables to conclude 
that inside market information is an important factor leading to extra market gains for 
the CNCSSF. We also suggest that the CNCSSF has less inside information on direct 
investment, indicating that the institution has no information advantage over entrusted 
investors regarding this investment type. This again explains why direct investment 
has lower returns compared to entrusted investment funds.  
Thirdly, does the CNSSF as a special fund have a stabilizing effect on the stock 
market? To analyze how the CNSSF affects the Chinese stock market, Graph 1 shows 
the relationship between the quarterly CNSSF stock value and the development of the 
Shanghai-Shenzhen Securities Composite Index (SSSCI). Graph 1 indicates that the 
SSSCI and the CNSSF move in tandem with a slight delay. As an example, the SSSCI 
reached its peak in December 2007, while the CNSSF began to sell in June 2007. In 
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September 2008, the CNSSF started to buy in and three months later the SSSCI began 
to grow; the CNSSF’s share in the stock market increased by 17 percent during this 
period. It is possible that the CNSSF sacrifices its gains for market stabilization, given 
that it has lower returns as analyzed below, and is positively correlated with the 
SSSCI. We therefore developed a cash flow index to analyze the correlation between 
the cash movement of the CNSSF and stock index volatility. The results indicate that 
cash movement and stock index volatility have a negative correlation and every 1 
percent increase in cash flow results in a 0.114 percent decrease in volatility.  
 
Graph1：Trends of the CNSSF stock investment and the SSSCI（CNSSF stock 
investment, SSSCI） 
 
To find out whether stock market stabilization is the reason for the CNCSSF’s lower 
stock investment return, we analyzed the CNCSSF’s effect on market stability and we 
suggest that there is a difference between direct and entrusted investment. Direct 
investment has a greater impact on stabilizing the market, while entrusted investment 
is geared towards higher returns. There is no doubt that the Chinese National Social 
Security Fund (CNSSF) plays an important role in stabilizing the Chinese capital 
market. However, China needs to create a healthy and liberal capital market in the 
long run. This requires the Chinese government to reduce its role in the capital market. 
Through marketization it increases the return of the CNSSF and meanwhile helps 
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develop a healthy capital market, from which both the CNCSSF and mutual fund 
investors can benefit. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Variable Construction 
4.1.1 Portfolio return 
We followed the method used by Wermers (2003), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), 
using weight sum returns to obtain the CNSSF portfolio return, resulting in: 
, , , 1 , 1 , 1( ) /i t i t i t i t i tR P P Divd P− − −= − +                  (1) 
, ,t j t j tPr w R=∑                                          (2) 
where tiP , is the price of stock i in portfolio at time t , tiDivd , is the dividends of stock 
i from t-1 to t . tjw , is the weight of the stock j in portfolio at time t. 
4.1.2 Depth and width of asset allocation 
Referring to the Pollet and Wilson (2008) portfolio disparity index, we used the 
regularly reported stock assets disclosure of the CNSSF portfolios and defined the 
portfolio breadth indicators (Width) as the natural logarithm of the sum of each 
portfolio stock amount. The combination of depth (Depth) is measured by the 
weighted holding share of each portfolio, expressed by the formula: 
(1 )i iWidth log n= +                      (3) 
1
n
i ik ik
k
Depth w c
=
=∑     (4) 
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  is the amount of stock in fund i, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the proportion of stock k in the fund 
portfolio, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the proportion of stock k of total market capitalization. 
4.1.3 Private information 
Following Amihud and Geyonko (2013), Shen et al. (2013), we used the four-factor 
model of Carhart (1997) in order to measure the relevant fluctuations of the funds by 
the fitting degree R2, which we obtained from the regression of the return of funds. 
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The authors hypothesize that the (1-R2) indicator includes mutual funds’ heterogeneity 
information, which cannot be observed. A higher (1-R2) implies a greater amount of 
private information (Teoh et al., 2009). We use PI (private information) to measure the 
fund’s inside market information. 
 
4.1.4 Other variables 
According to Chen et al. (2004), we selected the control variables affecting the fund's 
performance: fund size (Size), equal to the natural logarithm of the quarter net total 
value; fund family size (Fsize), equal to the natural logarithm of the quarter net total 
value of all funds controlled by the same holding fund; fund asset allocation risk 
(Beta), measured by the four-factor model of the past 36-month rolling market factor 
coefficients obtained by the regression model (Carhart,1997).  
 
4.2 Sample description 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the relevant variables. The median and the 
mean of the CNSSF asset allocation depth indicators are close, indicating that the 
depth distribution of the CNSSF asset allocation is uniform. Width indicates that the 
asset allocation is quite diverse. The average social security fund portfolio selects 15 
stocks, the smallest fund portfolio consists of only one stock, the largest portfolio 
contains 72 stocks. The mean of the amount of private information (PI) is 0.431, 
almost equal to the median, indicating that the fund portfolio has access to more 
private information. Asset allocation risk of individual stocks is very close to 1, but 
the gap between the minimum and maximum values also show that the CNSSF 
portfolios’ appetite for risk in asset allocation is quite diverse. From 2004 to 2012, the 
average size of the CNSSF portfolios investing in stocks increased from 15.8 billion 
yuan to 1,263 billion yuan. The average-sized funds reached 136.4 billion yuan by 
fund family. It cannot be concluded that the CNCSSF usually entrusts large fund 
companies. 
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Table 2                 Variables description 
Variable Mean Median Min Max  Std. 
Depth 2.478 2.313 0.120 9.500 1.295 
Width 14.87 13 1 72 11.1 
PI 0.431 0.432 0.153 0.749 0.093 
Beta 0.998 0.986 0.239 2.036 0.174 
Size(billion) 1.263 0.6263 0.00513 15.88 1.718 
Fsize(billion) 136.418 71.761 5.137 158.755 175.849 
 
We compared direct investment returns and entrusted investment returns of CNCSSF 
using a t-test. The test results are reported in Table 3. Taking into account that the 
yield data may not follow a normal distribution, the non-parametric Wilcoxon p-
values are also reported.  
The results in Table 3 show that the average monthly return of direct investment is 
1.18 percent, while the average monthly return of entrusted investment is 2.53 percent. 
The difference is thus 1.35 percent. The result is significant at the 1-percent level, the 
t value is 3.17 and it therefore passes the Wilcoxon test. The average direct investment 
return is significantly lower than the average return of entrusted investment. For a 
more detailed analysis, we took a closer look at the differences between the returns of 
direct investment and entrusted investment, and tested whether the differences are 
statistically significant. The only funds that do not pass the t value test are China 
Merchants Fund and CICC; the t values of the remaining funds pass the test. The 
initial results in Table 3 confirm that investment efficiency is lower for direct 
investment compared to entrusted investment, but the p-value of Huaxia Fund and 
South Fund is not statistically significant. It should therefore be further researched by 
means of a time series angle-depth study. 
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Table 3                Monthly Return Difference Test 
 
Return  
(%) 
Diff. 
(%) 
t value Wilcox.p value 
Direct operation invest. 1.180    
Entrust Invest. 2.532 1.352 4.23*** 0.001 
Boshi Fund 2.274 1.094 3.17*** 0.005 
Huaxia Fund 2.934 1.754 3.11 *** 0.012 
Jiashi Fund 2.21 1.03 2.23** 0.281 
Penghua Fund 2.60 1.42 3.58*** 0.003 
Changsheng Fund 2.697 1.517 3.44*** 0.001 
Yifangda Fund 2.031 0.851 1.69* 0.3167 
Nanfang Fund 2.956 1.776 4.54*** 0.0016 
Zhaoshang Fund 3.597 2.417 4.89*** <0.001 
Guotai Fund 1.6901 0.510 1.223 0.7567 
ZhongjinCorporatation 2.024 0.844 1.15 0.067 
*, **, *** denote significance at10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
 
4.3 Investment efficiency 
According to classical investment theory, a fund's investment income and investment 
risk are closely related. A high yield is not always the result of high efficiency; it may 
also be a compensation for great risk. The risk-adjusted return on investment can 
measure the level of efficiency of the investment. We used the Fama and French 
(1993), Carhart (1997) four-factor model to measure the risk-adjusted CNSSF 
portfolio returns. Empirical research generally believes that assets’ return can be 
explained by the four-factor model. The intercept (alpha) reflects the abnormal returns 
which the risk factors cannot explain. If alpha is statistically significantly greater than 
0, the fund’s investment portfolio is able to achieve excess returns and fund managers 
have superior stock-picking ability and greater investment efficiency. Conversely, if 
the alpha is statistically significantly smaller than 0, the fund manager has low 
investment efficiency. The four-factor model is expressed as follows: 
1 2 3 4( )pt ft i mt ft it it it itR R R R SMB HML MOMα β β β β ε− = + − + + + + (5) 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 is the reinvested consolidated monthly market rate of return of market 
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capitalization-weighted cash dividends; R𝑓𝑓 is the risk-free rate equal to the one-year 
deposit interest rate divided by 12; SMB, HML are scale factor and book-to-market 
ratio factor, in line with Fama and French (1993); MOM is the structure momentum 
factor, in line with Carhart (1997). The regression results and Newey-West adjusted t-
values are reported in Table 4. Panel A is equally weighted, Panel B is weighted by 
the total net value, and Panel C is weighted by the sum of the flow of funds. 
The regression results of the four-factor model and adjusted t values using the Newey-
West method are reported in Table 4. We use the Newey-West method because the 
regression residual may be correlated.  It also can control for the residual auto-
correlation of the regression to obtain a more accurate t value. The Adj.R2 of all 
models in Table 4 are greater than 0.6, the overall sample Adj.R2 being 0.965. The 
sample of entrusted investment reaches 0.963 and the great majority of the risk factors 
of the model coefficient are statistically significant. These good results imply a 
superior explanatory ability of the four-factor model. It can be clearly observed from 
Panel A that the alpha of the social security fund portfolio as a whole is positive, but 
not statistically significant, indicating that after the fund's investment risk is taken into 
account, the social security fund cannot obtain excess returns. The direct investment 
alpha is not statistically significant, but the entrusted investment alpha is significant at 
the 10% level with a value of 0.36%. In other words, entrusted portfolios can achieve 
abnormal returns of 4.32% a year. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of entrusted investment fund risk-adjusted 
returns. It can be seen that entrusted investment fund companies perform differently. 
Boshi Fund, the South Fund, Zhaoshang Fund and Yifangda fund are able to obtain 
statistically significant excess yields, while the remaining funds cannot obtain 
abnormal returns. CICC's excess return is significantly negative at the 5% level. 
Among them, the highest excess return comes from the South Fund, with annual 
excess returns of 17.1, followed by Yifangda fund (9.56 percent), Zhaoshang Fund 
(9.12 percent) and Boshi Fund (5.65 percent).  
The results in Table 4 show that the overall efficiency of the national social security 
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fund investment is not high; only 40 percent of entrusted investment institutions are 
able to obtain excess returns. Overall, the efficiency of direct investment is lower than 
that of entrusted investment. The returns of entrusted investments are quite diverse; 
the South Fund's investment shows the highest level of efficiency, while CICC 
investment is the least efficient. 
  
16 
 
Table 4                         Four-factor risk-adjusted return 
Panel A  Direct operation-entrusted Investment   
 alpha(%) RM-RF SMB HML MOM Adj.R2 
Total  0.3137 0.956*** 0.392*** -0.341*** 0.234*** 0.9648 
 (1.59) (50.78) (10.74) (-6.76) (4.11)  
Direct -0.25 1.20*** 0.11 -0.285 -0.271 0.5954 
 (-0.243) (12.31) (0.583) (-1.08) (-0.918)  
Entrusted 0.360* 0.949*** 0.403*** -0.359*** 0.257*** 0.9626 
 (1.78) (49.13) (10.75) (-6.91) (4.39)  
Panel B  Entrusted investment Return   
Boshi 0.471** 0.896*** 0.012 -0.240*** 0.139** 0.9127 
Fund (2.17) (32.40) (0.14) (-2.90) (2.24)  
Guotai 0.487 1.001*** 0.260** -0.405*** 0.256 0.8134 
Fund (0.88) (17.89) (2.20) (-2.88) (1.35)  
Huaxia 0.676 0.977*** 0.387*** -0.520*** 0.428** 0.7901 
Fund (1.15) (34.83) (10.47) (-5.61) (2.55)  
Jiashi 0.504 0.885*** 0.111 -0.373*** 0.284** 0.8665 
Fund (1.37) (24.86) (1.60) (-4.04) (2.67)  
Nanfang 1.425** 1.369*** 0.071 0.113 0.752** 0.8765 
Fund (2.03) (18.88) (0.60) (0.34) (2.66)  
Penghua 0.291 0.919*** 0.291*** -0.429*** 0.547*** 0.8795 
Fund (0.986) (31.45) (3.68) (-5.21) (8.54)  
Yifangda 0.797* 0.900*** 0.379*** -0.785*** 0.290*** 0.8272 
Fund (1.75) (43.81) (9.48) (-21.45) (4.09)  
Changsheng 0.279 0.919*** 0.342*** -0.416** 0.293 0.7494 
Fund (0.47) (14.87) (3.12) (-2.26) (1.29)  
Zhaoshang 0.76* 1.007*** 0.097* -0.406*** 0.180 0.7766 
Fund (1.81) (29.93) (1.71) (-4.66) (1.49)  
Zhongjin -1.89** 1.096*** 0.281 -0.347 -0.001 0.6659 
Corparation (-2.21) (9.43) (1.25) (-1.48) (-0.01)  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. Value in brackets is the White 
method-adjusted robust t value.  
 
4.4 Cause for differences in investment efficiency 
4.4.1 Investment Style 
If the risk factor coefficients in Table 4 are statistically significant, we can infer 
information about the style of the social security fund's investment (Davis, 2001). The 
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market portfolio coefficient factor of direct investment is 1.2, which is significant at 
the 1% level. However, the remaining coefficient factors are not statistically 
significant; the market portfolio coefficient factor of entrusted investment is 0.949, 
and the four factors are all statistically significant. This result suggests that direct 
investment prefers high-risk stocks but cannot obtain excess returns while entrusted 
investment funds prefer to vary investment scale and investment momentum to obtain 
excess returns. In addition, the South Fund’s momentum factor is significantly 
positive, indicating that the South Fund has the "momentum effect", i.e. it follows the 
investment style of buying the winners and selling the losers. All risk factors in the 
Yifangda Fund are statistically significant, but the market factor coefficient is only 0.9, 
indicating an overall lower risk. Yifangda tends to invest in small companies with a 
low book-to-market value and to use momentum investment strategy. The Boshi Fund 
reveals low market risk, high momentum investment and a high book-to-market 
investment style. Simple investment styles, as well as the excess configuration of the 
high-risk stocks may be the reasons for the low efficiency of the social security fund 
investment. 
4.4.2 Asset Allocation 
The previous section already confirms that the CNSSF pursues two different 
investment styles and that they differ significantly in efficiency. Merton (1987) 
suggests in his theory that, due to the presence of market transaction costs and 
asymmetric information, the price may not be a complete reflection of all the 
information of the assets. If investors are able to tap inside market information, they 
can receive excess returns. Studies by Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and LuoRonghua 
et al. (2011) find that the initiative of the fund manager may open access to more 
inside market information and result in a better investment performance. This article 
draws on Amihud and Goyenko (2013) to measure the amount of inside market 
information (private information) involved in social security fund asset allocation. In 
addition, we used the Amihud and Goyenko (2013) method to study the relationship 
between the presence of private information in the social security fund and investment 
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performance. Pollet and Wilson (2008) suggest that the depth and breadth of the 
fund's stock selection can significantly affect the investment performance of the fund. 
To clarify the role of private information on the social security fund investment return 
there is a need to control the risk of the portfolio (Beta), the breadth of asset allocation 
(Width) and the depth (Depth). 
Table 5 shows the results of the comparison of the CNSSF portfolio asset allocation 
types. Panel A exhibits the average of the overall sample of the CNSSF and direct 
investment. The results indicate  that access to private information of the overall 
sample is 0.438, while that of direct investment is 0.398, i.e., it is lower than the 
overall access to private information, and therefore lower than access to private 
information on the part of the entrusted companies. The average risk coefficient of 
direct investment stock is 1.03, higher than the overall average. Direct investment 
indicators for both depth and breadth are below those of entrusted investment. 
For a clearer comparison between direct investment and entrusted investment asset 
allocation differences, we subtracted the direct investment asset allocation indicator 
from the entrusted investment asset allocation indicator, and then used a t-test to test 
for statistical significance. Table 5, Panel B, shows that the entrusted investment’s 
access to private information is significantly higher compared to direct investment at 
the 1-percent significance level. This shows that access to private information is 
greater for entrusted investment than direct investment, and that access to private 
information may achieve higher returns. 
Secondly, from the aspect of the equity portfolio risk coefficient, the beta coefficient 
of Boshi Fund, Harvest Fund and the other four funds is significantly lower than that 
of direct investment. The equity portfolio’s beta coefficient of Huaxia Fund, South 
Fund, and CICC is significantly higher than that of the direct investment portfolio. In 
addition, with the exception of the Guotai Fund, the disparity indicators of the rest of 
the fund’s asset allocation depth is significantly higher than those of the direct 
investment portfolio, and the fund’s asset allocation breadth indicators are 
significantly lower than those of the direct investment portfolio. These two indicators 
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fully explain that the CNSSF entrusted investments are very concentrated, which may 
be one of the reasons for the low return from direct investment. 
  
20 
 
Table 5: Asset Allocation: Comparison 
Panel A   Total     
 PI  Beta  Depth  Width  
 Mean t  Mean t  Mean t  Mean t  
Total 0.438  0.984  2.541  16.02  
Direct 0.398  1.03  1.95  10.97  
Entrusted  0.4362  0.993  2.53  16.09  
Entrusted- Direct 0.382*** 3.26 0.037 -1.62 0.58* 1.83 5.11** 2.01 
Panel B   Entrusted-Direct Investment    
 PI  Beta  Depth  Width  
 difference t  difference t  difference t  difference t  
Boshi Fund 0.43*** 6.99 0.915*** -19.83 2.49*** 9.84 5.41*** 2.12 
Huaxia Fund 0.42*** 5.12 1.041 1.35 2.03 1.11 -2.99 -1.16 
Jiashi Fund 0.47*** 13.9 1.074*** 5.58 2.65*** 10.98 5.55** 2.15 
Penghua Fund 0.447*** 10.0 0.975*** -7.89 2.91*** 14.69 5.56** 2.56 
Changsheng Fund 0.44*** 9.55 1.100*** 8.41 2.54*** 6.836 -2.51*** -0.97 
Yifangda Fund 0.474*** 15.5 0.968*** -7.41 2.92*** 15.56 6.55*** 2.54 
Nanfang Fund 0.449*** 11.9 0.974*** -8.84 2.76*** 14.05 12.91*** 4.88 
Zhaoshang Fund 0.438*** 6.53 0.995*** -3.84 2.46*** 6.132 -2.89 -1.1 
Guotai Fund 0.411*** 2.93 1.005*** -3.25 2.17*** 4.077 -5.88*** 2.2 
ZhongjinCorporatation 0.454*** 5.85 1.184*** 12.63 2.38*** 2.979 -5.82** -2.1 
*, **, *** denote significance at10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.  
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4.4.3 Regression Results 
Furthermore, we used a panel data regression analysis to test for a link between access 
to private information and social security fund investment return. In reference to 
models by Pollet and Wilson (2008), Amihud and Geyonko (2013), which are 
designed to control for fund size, fund family size and other factors, we have 
developed the following empirical model to verify the significance of the social 
security fund performance factors. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 *
it it it it it it
it it i it
Return PI Beta Width Depth Size
Fsize PI DI Year u
α β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
     (6) 
Among them, Returnit represents the weighted yield of fund i in quarter t, PI 
represents the average weighted access to private information of the portfolio, Beta 
represents the average portfolio risk coefficient. Width and Depth, respectively, 
represent the breadth and depth of the portfolio. Size represents the total market 
capitalization of the portfolio, Fsize is the total assets of the fund family, DI is a 
dummy variable; 1 if the sample is the portfolio of the direct investment, 0 otherwise. 
Year is a time dummy variable. Before conducting empirical research, we first ran a 
variable multi-collinearity test. The variance inflation factor (VIF) values are below 
2.5, which means there is no multi-collinearity in the regression results. 
The data used in this paper is quarterly unbalanced panel data. There are two ways to 
conduct an unbalanced panel data regression: fixed effects regression and random 
effects regression. The fixed effects regression assumes that the individual effects of 
the sample do not change with time, i.e., one can use the first-order differential or 
centralization to eliminate the individual effects, and then conduct an OLS regression 
to determine the coefficient. A random effects regression assumes that the individual 
effects cannot be observed over time, and it is possible to run a GLS regression to 
obtain the coefficient. We have taken into account that the individual effects, such as 
corporate culture of the social security funds which cannot be observed, may have an 
important impact on investment performance. In order to avoid endogeneity problems 
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by omitting variables, we used a fixed effects model for our analysis and run a 
Hausman test as a robustness check. 
Table 6 shows that all regressions from the Hausman test are significant at the 5 
percent level. The table also reports the fixed effects regression results and the White 
robust standard error-adjusted t-values. Column (1) shows the results of controlling 
for the fund family factors; private information (PI) and fund investment income are 
significantly positively related at the 5-percent level. The resulting economic 
implications for private information are that a one-unit increase results in an increase 
of the funds’ return by 0.36 percent. Our results thus confirm the findings of Amihud 
and Goyenko (2013) and Merton (1987). When controlling for other variables, the 
contribution of private information to the fund’s investment return increases. In Model 
(6), for example, private information is positively statistically significant at the 10-
percent level. The portfolio’s Beta coefficient and fund return show a significant 
positive correlation with each other.  
In addition, asset configuration depth and investment return are not statistically 
significantly correlated, while breadth and investment return show a significant 
negative correlation. This means that a broader investment scope results in a lower 
return, the same conclusion as adapted by Kacperczyk (2005), Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp (2010). The fund's investment also reveals a significant diminishing scale, 
for every 1 percent increase in scale; investment return is reduced by 4.68 percent. 
The PI * DI variable coefficient is negative, indicating that the return on direct 
investment is lower than the return on entrusted investment The coefficient however, 
is not statistically significant, indicating that direct investment and entrusted 
investment do not significantly differ from each other. 
Results in Table 6 confirm that the fund’s investment return is significantly related to 
the private information of fund asset allocation, the risk factor and dispersion. After 
controlling for other factors, there is no significant difference between the social 
security fund’s direct investment and entrusted investment returns. 
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Table 6                  Regression of Asset Allocation and Return 
  Seasonly Return   
 （1） （2） （3） （4） （5） （6） 
PI 0.360** 0.458*** 0.470*** 0.498*** 0.387** 0.477* 
 (2.80) (3.31) (3.29) (3.29) (2.27) (1.79) 
Beta  0.255** 0.256** 0.274*** 0.244** 0.246** 
  (2.69) (2.70) (2.87) (2.44) (2.43) 
Depth   -0.00327 -0.00596 -0.00833 -0.00837 
   (-0.25) (-0.43) (-0.60) (-0.60) 
Width    -0.00283* -0.00453** -0.00459** 
    (-2.07) (-2.69) (-2.71) 
Size     -0.0466** -0.0468** 
     (-2.19) (-2.23) 
PI*DI      -0.0977 
      (-0.43) 
FSize 0.0314* 0.0393** 0.0398** 0.0540*** 0.0708*** 0.0714*** 
 (1.77) (2.24) (2.36) (3.38) (3.29) (3.39) 
Cons -0.415* -0.799** -0.803** -0.942*** -0.731** -0.737** 
 (-1.84) (-2.79) (-2.82) (-3.38) (-2.49) (-2.50) 
Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 493 493 493 493 493 493 
R2 0.031 0.056 0.057 0.063 0.072 0.072 
Hausman 8.58** 11.16** 10.94** 12.93** 17.42*** 16.37** 
Prob>chi2 0.0137 0.0109 0.0273 0.0240 0.0078 0.0219 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%-levels respectively. Value in brackets is the White 
method-adjusted robust t value.  
 
4.4.4 Endogenous analysis 
Since we are not able to observe the correlation between the individual fund 
characteristics using investment performance, we use the fixed-effect model to reduce 
the endogeneity problem caused by omitting variables. However, the allocation of 
private information may still evoke endogeneity problems because institutional 
investors’ portfolios may cause a “herding” effect (Patrick and Strickland, 2002; Liu 
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and Tang, 2011).The stock price may react to information timely, increasing prices 
may attract market attention, thus private information may become public 
information.; so private information may be affected by the stock price. This 
establishes a reverse causal relationship between fund return and private information. 
To solve this endogenous problem, we used a two-stage instrumental variable method 
for our analysis. 
The difficulty lies in that the two-stage instrumental variable regression needs to 
select the appropriate instrumental variables that meet two conditions. Firstly, 
instrumental variables must be closely related to private information about the 
configuration of social security fund assets. Secondly, instrumental variables and the 
investment return must not be related. From the fund company’s R&D point of view, 
we selected the average amount of private information of the fund’s equity portfolio 
as the instrumental variable. The fund company’s research department will likely 
share the research reports within the company. So the social security fund portfolio, 
like other funds, will also be affected by R&D information inside the company. 
Therefore, the private information of the social security fund portfolio should be 
associated with the company’s average amount of private information (Nanda et al., 
2004). For example, every Chinese mutual fund company has a meaningful research 
department for intensive research. However, they also buy analysis reports from other 
brokers, thus sharing information with other mutual fund companies. Secondly, the 
correlation between the average amount of fund companies’ private information and a 
social security fund portfolio’s return must not be high. In this paper, we use an 
Anderson LR test to check whether the instrumental variables exhibit a weak 
instrument problem, a Cragg-Donald Wald test to check whether the instrumental 
variables exhibit an under-identification problem, and a Sargan test to identify a 
potential over-identification problem of the instrumental variables. 
Table 7 shows the results of a two-stage fixed effects regression. For robustness 
considerations, we use the mean and the median of the fund’s average amount of 
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private information as the social security fund portfolio’s private information 
instrumental variables. A Hausman test shows that the instrumental variable model is 
superior to non-instrumental variable models, indicating the presence of a private 
information endogeneity problem. The results of the first stage regression show that 
the mean and the median of private information are positively correlated with the 
private information of the CNSSF, and are significant at the 1-percent and 5-percent 
levels, respectively. Secondly, an Anderson LR test is significant at the 1-percent level, 
indicating that there is no weak instrumental variable problem. The Cragg-Donald 
Wald test and the Sargan test indicate that there is no under- or over-identification 
problem for the instrumental variable. Furthermore, the above test results show that 
the selection of the instrumental variables in this article is reasonable. Hence, it is 
appropriate to use the two-stage instrumental variable method for analysis. 
The second-stage regression results point out that private information and fund 
investment returns have a significant positive relationship. PI * DI is statistically 
negatively significant, which illustrates that the return of direct investment decreases 
with greater access to private information. This is consistent with the previous 
statistical results that private information of direct investment is significantly lower 
than that of entrusted investment. The results of the remaining variables are 
fundamentally the same as in Table 6, confirming that the two-stage fixed-effects 
regression results are robust. 
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Table 7                      2 SLS fixed-effects regression 
 First-stage Second-stage First-stage Second-stage 
 PI（mean） Return PI（median） Return 
MR2 0.348***  0.127**  
 (2.85)  (2.18)  
PI  4.922**  11.79*** 
  (2.26)  (2.86) 
PI*DI 0.9634*** -4.411** 0.959*** -11.12*** 
 (63.11) (-2.08) (61.35) (-2.77) 
Beta -0.0323*** 0.392*** -0.0425*** 0.686*** 
 (-4.46) (3.67) (-3.48) (2.60) 
Depth 0.00134 -0.0172 0.00158 -0.0265 
 (1.32) (-1.47) (1.57) (-1.56) 
Width 0.00039** -0.00655*** 0.00041** -0.00991*** 
 (2.2) (-3.00) (2.23) (-2.92) 
Fsize 0.005* -0.0327 0.004 -0.0423 
 (1.65) (-1.32) (1.39) (-1.26) 
Size -0.003** 0.0974*** -0.004** 0.126*** 
 (-2.09) (4.59) (-2.48) (3.90) 
N 493 493 493 493 
R2 0.9259 0.1524 0.9236 0.1579 
Hausman test(p-value) 56.21***(0.000) 19.56***(0.0066) 
Anderson LR (p-value) 6.747***(0.0001) 13.691***(0.0034) 
Cragg-Donald Wald 7.704**(<0.05) 4.610**(0.05) 
Sargan (p-value) 2.942(0.2297) 2.316(0.3141) 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. Value in 
brackets is robust White method-adjusted t value. An Anderson LR test is used for the instrument 
under-identification problem. If Anderson LR is significant, the variable is correlated with 
endogenous variables. Cragg-Donald test issued for the weak-identification problem. If Cragg-
Donaldis not significant, instrument variables are highly correlated with the endogenous variable. The 
Sargan test is used for the over-identification problem. If it is not significant, there is no over-
identification problem and it is not correlated with the residuals. 
 
4.4.5 Robustness check 
For robustness considerations, this paper also uses the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model regression. The results are consistent with the four-factor model. In 
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addition, taking into account the fact that the yield data does not completely follow a 
normal distribution, we use the self-help method which results in a robust t value. The 
results do not change when conducting this test; hence the results in the regressions 
are robust. 
5. Further studies 
CNCSSF, as a special institutional investor, should have a market-stabilizing function. 
As indicated in Figure 1, the CNSSF and the stock market have a lead-lag relationship, 
and CNCSSF direct investment returns are significantly lower than those of entrusted 
investment. Does direct investment stabilize the market and have a weaker investment 
return as a result? To answer this question, it is necessary to control for the key factors 
that affect stock market volatility. We drew on He et al. (2007), using the following 
model to investigate the CNSSF’s market-stabilizing function. 
1 2 3 4 5
7 7
t t t t t t
t
Vol Flow Tover Nipo Finan Fvol
Mrtn Mfrtn
α β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + +
    (7) 
Vol is the volatility of the stock market; we use CSI (Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Composite Index)2 quarter-over-quarter standard deviations of the daily yield and two 
range indicators (max-min) to measure Vol. Tover is the average quarterly turnover 
rate of the securities market measuring market investor sentiment; the greater the 
index, the more active the market. Nipo represents the number of IPOs in the quarter. 
Finan represents the IPO financing amount. Fvol is the volatility of foreign markets. 
Following Sheng et al. (2008), we use the Hang Seng Index in Hong Kong as an 
alternative variable most closely associated with China’s market in this paper. Mrtn 
and Mfrtn respectively denote the average yield of the CSI and the Hang Seng Index. 
Flow is the social security fund’s liquidity ratio. Referring to Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
and Huang et al. (2007) regarding the definition of the fund’s liquidity, and assuming 
2 The CSI index is a capitalization-weighted stock market index designed to replicate the performance of stocks 
traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
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that the cash flow takes place at the end of the term, Flow is defined as follow: 
1 1( (1 ) ) /t t t t tFlow Mv r Mv Mv− −= − +   (8) 
Mv is the scale of the market value of the social security fund and r is the social 
security fund investment yield. Flow ratios take into account the scale factors of the 
social security fund, thus depicting the quarterly liquidity of the social security fund. 
If Flow is greater than 0, the social security funds are funneling money into the stock 
market; Conversely, when Flow is smaller than 0, the social security funds are moving 
money out of the stock market. 
 
The robustness regression results are shown in Table 7. It can be easily observed from 
the overall sample that the CNSSF significantly reduces market volatility. Every 1-
percent increase in CNSSF’s investment decreases the volatility of the market index 
by 0.114 percent. This shows that the stabilization function of the CNSSF is highly 
significant. In addition, the CNSSF direct investment coefficient is significantly 
negative at the 5-percent level, 2.8 times the entrusted investment coefficient. The 
economic implications of this result are that with every 1-percent increase in CNSSF 
direct investment, the CNSSF’s effect on market stability is 2.8 times better than that 
of entrusted investment, which makes its market stabilization function significantly 
higher than that of entrusted investment. In addition, the results’ robustness points out 
that direct investment is significant at the 10-percent level, while the entrusted 
investment coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant. This further verifies 
that direct investment has a stronger stabilization function. 
As a further robustness check, we also follow the advice of Zheng (1999), assuming 
that capital inflow takes place at the beginning of the term and we repeat the previous 
regression. The results are almost identical with those in Table 8, indicating that the 
results of this paper are robust. 
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Table 8              CNSSF stable market 
  Volatility   Return Range  
 Total Direct Entrusted Total Direct Entrusted 
Flow -0.114** -0.377** -0.135** -0.397 -1.59* -0.419 
 (-2.29) (-2.49) (-2.06) (-1.32) (-1.73) (-1.08) 
Tover 0. 475*** 0. 362** 0. 519*** 3.19*** 2.70*** 3.33*** 
 (3.40) (2.57) (3.66) (4.55) (3.42) (4.68) 
Nipo -0. 186 -0. 366* -0. 182 - 2.45* - 2.95** -2.58* 
 (-0.78) (-1.85) (-0.74) (-1.77) (-2.31) (-1.95) 
Finan 0.0958 0.0988 0.0938 0. 555 0. 572 0. 547 
 (1.57) (1.66) (1.53) (1.61) (1.67) (1.58) 
Fvol 0.323*** 0.319*** 0.322*** 0.876 0.872 0.864 
 (3.32) (3.43) (3.29) (1.60) (1.62) (1.58) 
Mrtn -0.218 -0.155 -0.242 -1.981 -1.706 -2.061 
 (-0.58) (-0.43) (-0.62) (-0.92) (-0.83) (-0.94) 
Fmrtn -1.083* -1.132* -1.100* -7.396** -7.450** -7.535** 
 (-1.91) (-2.00) (-1.94) (-2.19) (-2.22) (-2.22) 
cons 0.0102*** 0.0105*** 0.00985*** 0.0582*** 0.0606*** 0.0568*** 
 (4.16) (4.53) (3.99) (3.86) (4.17) (3.77) 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Adj.R2 0.718 0.724 0.709 0.661 0.673 0.655 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, 1-percent levels, respectively. The value in 
brackets is the robust White method-adjusted t value.  
6. Conclusion 
Our in-depth research on the investment efficiency of the two types of investment 
carried out by the Chinese National Social Security Fund shows that, on the whole, 
CNSSF investment efficiency is not high and cannot achieve excess market returns. 
More specifically, all entrusted investment portfolio funds combined do achieve 
excess annual returns of 4.32 percent, while direct investment portfolio funds do not. 
At the same time, entrusted investments differ greatly in their return performance; 
only 40 percent of the fund companies are able to obtain abnormal returns after being 
given enough compensation for their risk in the market. This article also finds that 
private information and investment returns are significantly positively correlated, and 
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that the amount of private information involved in direct investment is significantly 
lower than that involved in entrusted investment, explaining the inefficiency of direct 
investment. Our further research shows that the CNSSF has an important market-
stabilizing function, with the market-stabilizing function of direct investment being 
almost three times that of entrusted investment.  
This article has three main results. Firstly, the CNSSF stock market investment cannot 
achieve above normal returns but it has a strong market-stabilizing function. In 
addition, 6 in 10 entrusted investment companies do not show a superb ability to 
invest in the stock market, resulting in the CNSSF not meeting its “value-added” 
requirements. Therefore, China’s social security system faces a gargantuan pension 
gap that is extremely perilous for an aging population. How to improve the entrusted 
companies' investment efficiency has become a pressing issue for the CNSSF. Firstly, 
the investment of CNSSF should encourage competition. The Chinese National 
Council for Social Security Fund should therefore reduce or terminate investments 
into the investment fund companies with the weakest performance and allocate 
additional funds to better performing companies. Secondly, private information plays 
an important role for social security funds’ returns. CNSSF has an indisputable 
advantage in terms of financial strength and information channels. In order to protect 
the interests of investors and the unbiased market, regulatory agencies need to 
monitor the social security funds’ investment behavior in China to avoid insider 
trading, market manipulation and other violations of the market. Thirdly, China needs 
to construct a multi-layered wealth management market, which requires relatively 
independent institutional investors. These institutional investors’ financial innovation 
as well as R&D should be supported by the social security fund to obtain greater 
excess returns. 
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